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LAND USE PLANNING IN THE COASTAL ZONE:
PROTECTING A SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEM WITH
TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT CREDITS
I. INTRODUCTION
California's coastline offers a spectrum of natural and
scenic beauty, extending from rugged bluffs in the north to
warm white sand beaches in the south. The coastal region also
provides an economic base as diverse as its geography. Rich in
natural and man-made resources, the coastal economy sup-
ports productive industries including agriculture, manufactur-
ing, tourism, and housing.1
The interaction between these contrasting and often con-
flicting environmental and economic factors has also fostered
heated political debate over appropriate governmental policy
toward coastal resources. Developers and property owners are
anxious to fully realize economic returns while conservation-
ists advocate restrictive growth policies.
The California Legislature has addressed the complex is-
sues confronting coastal decision-making with correspondingly
comprehensive legislation. Beginning in 1972 with the original
California Coastal Act, the Legislature has enacted expansive
© 1981 by Richard 0. McDonald
1. There are approximately 3.5 million acres of agricultural land in the Califor-
nia coastal zone, providing 350,000 jobs and an annual harvest valued at over $500
million. The coastal zone produces 98-100% of all of California's artichokes, brussel
sprouts, broccoli, celery, and avocados. Other coastal crops include lima beans, cab-
bage, cauliflower, cucumbers, lettuce, green onions, spinach, apples, lemons, strawber-
ries, grapefruit, and tomatoes. The area is also well suited for grazing, and is able to
support at least twice as many animals per acre as the statewide average.
Los Angeles, one of the coastal counties, is the state's leading manufacturing
county and the center of California's major industrial complex. Manufacturing and
construction account for over 25% of total personal income in the coastal zone, a
figure approaching $15 billion. The Southern California Visitor Council has estimated
that 8.5 million out-of-state visitors spent over $2 billion in the 10-county southern
California coastal zone in 1973.
According to the 1970 U.S. census, over 5 million people live within six miles of
the California coastline and 700,000 of those live within a thousand yards of the
beach.
For a more detailed discussion of the California coastal economy, see U.S. DEP'T
OF COM., STATE OF CALIFORNIA COASTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND FINAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1977).
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legislation to regulate the scope and rate of economic develop-
ment in the coastal zone.2 The California Coastal Act adopts a
protective state policy toward the coast, and delegates author-
ity to the California Coastal Commission (hereinafter Com-
mission) to effect broad statutory objectives regarding the
preservation, utilization, development, and enjoyment of
coastal resources. The Commission has used its statutorily
delegated permit and planning powers to condition, limit, and
plan new development in accordance with the policies and
provisions of the Coastal Act.
On June 21, 1979, the Commission adopted Guidelines
that are intended to apply the policies of the Coastal Act in
the Malibu-Santa Monica Mountain coastal region.$ The
Guidelines establish certain criteria to aid the Commission in
its evaluation of permit applications for development, and
adopt a pilot program of transferable development credits
(hereinafter TDC's) to regulate the spatial pattern of new
housing in the area.
While the TDC pilot program is the first implementation
of TDC's in California,4 the concept is by no means novel.
2. The California Legislature has enacted a package of laws governing the
coastal area as part of its Coastal Zone Management Plan for the federal govern-
ment's Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA). 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976
& Supp. II 1978). The CZMA authorizes a federal grant-in-aid program to be admin-
istered by the Secretary of Commerce, with actual responsibility delegated to the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Office of Coastal Zone Manage-
ment. The aim of the program is to facilitate the establishment of state coastal
authorities empowered to manage coastal areas. States are given financial assistance
to achieve a plan for the effective management, use, protection, and development of
the coastal zone. California's Coastal Zone Management Plan consists of: the Califor-
nia Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1976 & Supp.
1980); the California Coastal Conservacy Act of 1976, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 31000-
31406 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); the California Urban and Coastal Bond Act of 1976,
CAL. PuB. RES. CODE, div. 5; and California Coastal Commission Regulations, CAL.
ADMIN. CODE, tit. 14, §§ 13000-14000.
3. The Malibu-Santa Monica Mountain area lies in Los Angeles County,. ap-
proximately ten miles west of the city of Los Angeles. The Guidelines are discussed in
depth at text accompanying notes 46-82 infra.
4. The TDC concept has been the subject of planning and feasibility studies
conducted by various local jurisdictions, including Sonoma and Matin counties, and
the city of Livermore, but has not been adopted outside the coastal zone. See Pater-
son, Development Rights Transfer in Livermore: A Planning Strategy to Conserve
Open Space, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 191 (1975); Kikel, Transfer of Development
Rights: Legal Implications and Legislative Requirements-Report for Matin County
Planning Department (June 1975); Official Memorandum from Steven Rikala to Bill
Press, State of California Office of Planning and Research (Feb. 9, 1979); Sedway-
Cooke, Central Sonoma County Density Transfer Project-Report to the Sonoma
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Other jurisdictions, primarily in the eastern United States,
have used TDC's as a method of preserving historic land-
marks and prime agricultural land.' TDC's have had limited
practical application, however, and many questions remain
concerning their legality and feasibility in land use planning.
Two essential issues in determining the legality of any
TDC program are: (1) whether the acting governmental body
has the authority to adopt TDC's; and (2) whether the TDC
regulation amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private
property without just compensation. The first issue can be ad-
dressed by evaluating the applicable enabling legislation to
determine the scope of authority vested in the acting govern-
mental agency. The second issue requires an analysis of the
extent to which the governmental action deprives restricted
landowners of their rights to realize reasonable economic re-
turns from their property.
This comment will address the two issues outlined above
by tracing the legislative history of the Coastal Act and ana-
lyzing policy as reflected in the statute. The Guidelines them-
County Planning Department (June 1976). These studies conclude that while TDC's
can be a lawful planning tool, administration of a TDC program on a county-wide
basis makes it a cumbersome alternative to such traditional planning techniques as
zoning, planned unit developments (PUD) and conservation easements.
5. The TDC concept was introduced in Loyd, New Approaches to Residential
Land Development, URB. LAND INST. TECH. BULL. 40 (1961). Since then TDC's have
been the subject of numerous academic works. See, e.g., Carmichael, Transferable
Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1974);
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75
(1973); Costonis, 'Fair' Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for
the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975);
Hagman, A New Deal: Trading Windfalls for Wipeouts, PLANNING (Sept. 1974); Mar-
cus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of
Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1974); Miner & Schnidman,
Transfer of Development Rights: An Introductory Statement, URB. LAND (Jan.
1975); Niemann, Historic Preservation and Transferable Development Rights, 1978
U. ILL. L.F. 927 (Jan. 1978); Comment, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable De-
velopment Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975).
6. Collier County, Florida, and Southampton, Long Island, New York have
adopted zoning ordinances that allow voluntary transfer of development rights as an
alternative to normal subdivisions. Chesterfield and Hillsborough Townships in New
Jersey have utilized a TDC system as an extension of the PUD concept in conjunc-
tion with the adoption of new master plans. The city of St. George, Vermont has
implemented a successful transfer program to preserve open space; the program is
unique insofar as receiver areas are publicly owned. Buckingham Township, Penn-
sylvania adopted a revised zoning ordinance in 1975, using TDC's to preserve agricul-
tural land. As will be discussed at text accompanying notes 115-25 infra, New York
City has also used TDC's successfully to preserve historic landmarks.
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selves will then be tested to determine whether TDC's are
consistent with statutory objectives, and whether enactment is
within the delegated authority of the Commission. After con-
cluding the Commission does have the authority to implement
TDC's, the comment will analyze whether the TDC program
as presently formulated will unconstitutionally deprive prop-
erty owners of their rights to realize reasonable economic re-
turns from their property.
I. THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT AND THE COASTAL
COMMISSION
A. The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972
After passage of "The Coastal Initiative," a public initia-
tive appearing on the November 1972 ballot,' the Legislature
enacted the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 19728
(hereinafter the 1972 Act). Prior to 1972, the coastal region
had been subject to the planning discretion of local jurisdic-
tions." Such a piecemeal approach afforded maximum local
flexibility in governing coastal activity, but led to a significant
deterioration of the coastal environment. The Coastal Initia-
tive was a clear public demand for comprehensive statewide
legislation to conserve coastal resources and plan future
development.
The 1972 Act established a four-year program for plan-
ning and managing the coastal zone.1" It declared that the
7. The Coastal Initiative appeared as Proposition 20 on the November 1972
ballot.
8. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (Deering 1976) (repealed 1977). The Act
was repealed by express statutory provision on January 1, 1977. Id. § 27650.
9. Prior to the passage of Proposition 20, California's 1,072 miles of mainland
coastline (excluding the San Francisco Bay, which since 1965 has been subject to the
jurisdiction of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission) and its 300 miles
of offshore channel island coastline were subject to the jurisdiction of 15 counties, 45
cities, and 42 states and 70 federal agencies.
10. The 1972 Act defined the coastal zone as "that land and water area of the
State of California. . . extending seaward to the outer limit of the state jurisdiction,
... and extending inland to the highest elevation of the nearest coastal mountain
range, except that in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego Counties, the inland
boundary of the coastal zone shall be the highest elevation of the nearest coastal
mountain range or five miles from the mean high tide line, whichever is the shorter
distance." CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27100 (Deering 1976) (repealed 1977).
The successor to the 1976 Act, the California Coastal Act of 1976 (hereinafter the
1976 Act) (discussed at text accompanying notes 23-45 infra), limits the inland
boundary of the coastal zone to 1,000 yards from the mean high tide line. In signifi-
[Vol. 21442
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coastal zone is a "distinct and valuable natural resource,""
and that the policy of the state is "to preserve, protect, and
where possible, to restore the resources of the coastal zone. s
It further found the coastal zone exists "as a delicately bal-
anced ecosystem"13 and invoked the state's police power to
"preserve the ecological balance of the coastal zone and pre-
vent its further deterioration and destruction."1 '
The 1972 Act created the California Coastal Zone Conser-
vation Commission and six regional commissions to imple-
ment statutory provisions. 6 The Commission was directed to
prepare and submit for legislative approval a comprehensive,
long-range plan for the coastal zone.' 6 The Act required that
the Commission's plan be consistent with several objectives,
including: "the preservation . . . of all living and non-living
coastal resources '17 and the "enhancement of the overall qual-
ity of the coastal zone environment." ' s The Act also outlined
certain specific components for inclusion in the plan, includ-
ing a land use element, a public access element, a recreation
element, and a population element for the establishment of
maximum desirable population densities.19
The Commission was further given "Interim Permit Con-
trol" 20 over development21 in the zone prior to adoption of the
cant coastal estuarine, habitat, and recreational areas it extends inland to the first
major ridgeline paralleling the sea or five miles from the mean high tide line, which-
ever is less, and in develojed urban areas the zone generally extends inland less than
1,000 yards. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30103(a) (West 1977).




15. Id. § 27001(d). The regional commissions are the North Coast, North Cen-
tral Coast, Central Coast, South Central Coast, South Coast, and San Diego Coast.
Id. § 27201. The 1976 Act has retained these regional commissions. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 30302 (West 1977).
16. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27300-27320 (Deering 1976) (repealed 1977).
17. Id. § 27302(c).
18. Id. § 27302(a).
19. Id. § 27304(c)(1), (4), (5), (8).
20. Id. §§ 27400-27428.
21. Section 27103 defined "development" as:
on land, in or under water, the placement or erection of any solid mate-
rial or structure; discharge or disposal of any dredged material or any
gaseous, liquid, solid, or thermal waste; grading, removing, dredging,
mining, or extraction of any materials; change in the density or intensity
of use of land, including lot splits; change in the intensity of use of
water, ecology related thereto, or of access thereto; construction, recon-
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ultimate plan. Any person wishing to perform any develop-
ment was required to obtain a permit from the regional com-
mission.2 2 Permit approval was left largely to the discretion of
the regional commission, although the statute required that
development not have "substantial adverse environmental or
ecological effect" and placed the burden of proof on the
developer.2 3
The 1972 Act established a protective state policy toward
the coast. It sought to halt the rapid ecological demise of the
coastal zone by placing strict environmental constraints on ec-
onomic expansion and creating a state agency with broad
powers to enforce the statute. The 1972 Act addressed long-
term policy issues by initiating a process of comprehensive
study and planning for the conservation of coastal resources.
Many conclusions of the planning study were incorporated
into the 1976 Act.
B. The California Coastal Act of 1976
The 1972 Act was scheduled to expire on January 1,
1977.24 In 1976, the California Legislature enacted The Cali-
fornia Coastal Act of 1976.28 The 1976 Act retreated from the
struction, demolition, or alteration of the size of any structure, including
any facility of any private, public, or municipal utility, and the removal
or logging of major vegetation.
Id. § 27103. The 1976 Act essentially retains this definition. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE
§ 30106 (West 1977).
22. Section 27400 required the affirmative vote of a majority of the total author-
ized membership of the regional commission for permit approval. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 27400 (Deering 1976) (repealed 1977). Section 27401 required a two-thirds
affirmative vote for certain types of development such as: "(a) Dredging, filling, or
otherwise altering bay, estuary, salt marsh, river mouth, slough, or lagoon; (b) Any
development which would reduce the size of any beach or other area usable for public
recreation; (c) Any development which would reduce or impose restrictions upon pub-
lic access to tidal and submerged lands, [or] beaches; (d) Any development which
would substantially interfere with. . . the line of sight toward the sea from the state
highway nearest the coast; and (e) Any development which would adversely affect
water quality, existing areas of open water free of visible structures, existing and po-
tential commercial and sport fisheries, or agricultural uses of land . . . ... Id. § 27401.
The 1976 Act has done away with the super-majority requirement for certain
types of development, stating only that "any person wishing to perform any develop-
ment in the coastal zone . . . shall obtain a coastal development permit." CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 30600(a) (West 1977).
23. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27402 (Deering 1976) (repealed 1977).
24. Id. § 27650.
25. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980). The origi-
nal language has been substantially amended by subsequent legislation, but, for pur-
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protective language of the 1972 Act, emphasizing instead a
"balanced utilization. . of coastal zone resources taking into
account the social and economic needs of the people."' 6 The
1976 Act recognizes that "carefully planned" future develop-
ment is "essential to the economic and social well-being of the
people . . of this state. 27 Although the 1976 Act continues
to recognize the coastal zone as "a delicately balanced ecosys-
tem,"28 it stresses utilization of coastal resources as well as
conservation and protection.2
The 1976 Act seeks to achieve this balanced result by
providing more specific conditions and standards for new de-
velopment, including a requirement that new development be
in close proximity to existing developed areas 0 that are able
to accommodate it. Even if the location of a proposed devel-
opment is deemed appropriate, the developer is further re-
quired to minimize the risk of geological instability to the site,
and minimize energy consumption and vehicle miles trav-
eled."1 In considering a permit application, the Commission
must evaluate scenic and visual impacts 2 likely to result from
the proposed development, and any effect the proposed devel-
opment will have on public access to the beach.38
poses of clarity, will still be referred to as the 1976 Act.
26. Id. § 30001.5(b) (West 1977).
27. Id. § 30001(d) (West Supp. 1980).
28. Id. § 30001(a) (West 1977).
29. The change in legislative policy is illustrated by comparing former CAL. PUB.
REs. CODE § 27001 (Deering 1976) (repealed 1977), and CAL PUB. RES. CODE §
30001.5(a) (West 1977). The 1972 Act provided "it is the policy of the state to pre-
serve, protect, and where possible, to restore the resources of the coastal zone." CAL.
PUB. R.s. CODE § 27001 (Deering 1976) (repealed 1977). The 1976 Act declares "the
basic goals of the state for the coastal zone are to. . .[p]rotect, maintain, and where
feasible, enhance and restore the overall quality of the coastal zone environment."
CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 30001.5(a) (West 1977). The 1972 Act does not specifically
define "possible." However, WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY 1771
(15th ed. 1966), defines "possible" as "capable of happening or being done." The 1976
Act defines "feasible" as "capable of being accomplished in a successful manner
within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, so-
cial, and technological factors." CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30108 (West 1977).
30. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30250 (West Supp. 1980).
31. Id. §§ 30253(2), (4) (West 1977).
32. Section 30251 requires approved development to "be sited and designed to
protect views to and along ocean and scenic coastal areas, to minimize the alteration
of natural land forms, to be visually compatible with the character of surrounding
areas, and, where feasible, to restore and enhance visual quality in visually degraded
areas." Id. § 30251.
33. Section 30001.5(c) states that one of the primary goals of the 1976 Act is to
provide public access to the coast. Id. § 30001.5(c). Section 30212(a) requires that
1981]
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The 1976 Act extended the life of the Commission, but
returned primary responsibility for the long-range manage-
ment of the coastal zone to local jurisdictions. The Act directs
jurisdictions to prepare Local Coastal Programs (hereinafter
LCP's) to implement the Act at the local level.3 4 The LCP's,
which are subject to final state approval, are to contain the
local jurisdiction's "(a) land use plans, (b) zoning ordinances,
(c) zoning district maps, and (d) within the sensitive coastal
resources areas, other implementing actions which when taken
together, meet the requirements of, and implement the provi-
sions and policies of, [the Act] at the local level."" The Com-
mission has the authority to approve or disapprove LCP's 6
and has adopted procedures governing the LCP certification
process.3 7 The standards for LCP acceptability are provided
in chapter 3 of the Coastal Act,88 and the Commission main-
tains an advisory role as to the precise contents of each
LCP.39
Once an LCP has been certified, the local planning au-
thority will assume responsibility for reviewing permits for de-
velopment. The regional commission will be abolished40 and
the state Commission relegated to the status of an administra-
tive appeals board.4" Prior to LCP certification, developers are
still required to obtain permits from the regional commis-
sion.4 2 The process is still largely discretionary, although spe-
new development projects provide public access from the nearest public roadway to
the shoreline and along the coast. Id. § 30212(a) (West Supp. 1980). Section 30252
provides that public access should be maintained and enhanced in locating new de-
velopment. Id. § 30252 (West 1977). Sections 30530-30534 establish that there is a
need for a coastal public access program. Id. §§ 30530-30534 (West Supp. 1980).
34. Id. § 30500(a) (West 1977).
35. Id. § 30108.6 (West Supp. 1980). The Commission is required to designate
"sensitive coastal resource areas" in accordance with the provisions of section 30502.
Id. § 30503 (West 1977).
36. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §8 30330-30342 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
37. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE 88 30513-30525.
38. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 88 30200-30260.
39. The local jurisdiction is authorized to request that the Commission prepare
its LCP. Id. § 30500(a) (West Supp. 1980).
40. Id. § 30305 (West 1977). The regional commissions are scheduled to ter-
minate by statute on June 30, 1981, whether or not all LCP's have been certified. Id.
(West Supp. 1980).
41. Id. § 30519(a) (West 1977).
42. Id. § 30600(b). The local jurisdiction may elect to exercise permit control
even prior to LCP certification by establishing adequate "procedures for filing,
processing, review, modification, approval, or denial of a coastal development per-
mit." Id. § 30600(b). See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30604, 30620.5 (West 1977 & Supp.
[Vol. 21446
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cific statutory standards such as those indicated above guide
the commissions.
In sum, the 1976 Act seeks to achieve long-term harmony
between the conflicting environmental and economic factors
outlined in the introductory remarks of this comment. Based
on extensive planning studies conducted between 1972 and
1975, the Legislature determined the most efficient long-term
utilization and protection of coastal resources could best be
achieved by effective planning at the local level. However,
since balanced resource utilization and conservation require
consideration of the entire coastal environment, the Act re-
tains the statewide Commission as a guiding force in the de-
velopment of the coastal zone. Until the final planning scheme
incorporating LCP's is established, the state agency continues
to have interim permit control over most development.' 3
II. THE SOUTH COAST REGIONAL INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES
A. Generally
The 1976 Act directs the Commission to establish interim
procedures for the submission, review and appeal of permit
applications prior to LCP certification." This interim process
includes the issuance of "interpretive guidelines designed to
assist local governments, the regional commissions, the [state]
commission, and persons subject to the provisions of [the
Coastal Act] in determining how the policies of [the Act] shall
be applied in the coastal zone prior to certification of local
coastal programs.' 4
Pursuant to this statutory directive, the South Coast Re-
gional Commission adopted Interpretive Guidelines on June
21, 1979. These Guidelines "interpret the policies of the
Coastal Act" by creating new criteria for the approval of
1980).
43. Some development does not require a permit from the regional commission.
Exempted development includes certain improvements to existing single family
residences (Id. §§ 30610(a), (b) (West 1977)); some maintenance dredging (Id. §
30610(c)); certain repair or maintenance activities (Id. § 30610(d)); certain developed
urban areas (Id. § 30610.5); power plants operating under the jurisdiction of the State
Energy Commission (Id. § 30413); and land held by the federal government (Id.
§ 30008).
44. Id. § 30620.
45. Id. § 30620(a)(3).
19811
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building permits.4 6 Recognizing the increasing demand for
housing in an attractive area with significant resources, the
Guidelines seek to "fairly allocate the area's limited service
and environmental carrying capacity. '47
The 1976 Act establishes a high priority for development
within or near "existing developed areas able to accommodate
it."P48 The Guidelines identify existing developed areas within
the region that are able to accommodate more development
and provide that such designation makes these areas likely
sites for new housing.4' The Guidelines further identify those
existing developed areas that would be best suited for imme-
diate expansion prior to adoption of the county's LCP. These
designations are based on standards for expansion set forth in
the Commission's Statewide Interpretive Guidelines." The
Statewide Interpretive Guidelines provide that existing devel-
oped areas may be expanded prior to LCP certification if the
following conditions are satisfied: 1) coastal resources within
the expansion area are permanently protected; 2) the lands
are near employment centers; 3) necessary urban services are
easily available; and 4) development of alternative sites would
pose a greater threat to coastal resources.5 1 The regional
Guidelines further provide that expansion of existing devel-
oped areas should be decided on a case by case basis, and that
a permit will be issued only if all direct and cumulative envi-
ronmental effects of the expansion are mitigated.52
46. California Coastal Commission, South Coast Regional Interpretive Guide-
lines (June 21, 1979) (hereinafter cited as Guidelines).
47. Id.
48. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 30250(a) (West 1977).
49. Guidelines, supra note 46, § A-3. The areas currently designated as "devel-
oped" are considered substantially committed to urban or suburban development, as
indicated by lot and parcel configuration, the substantial build-out of available par-
cels, and the existence of public and commercial services necessary to support the
community.
50. The Statewide Interpretive Guidelines were adopted pursuant to CAL. PuB.
REs. CODE § 30620(b) (West 1977) which directed the Commission to adopt perma-
nent procedures regulating the issuance of permits. The Statewide Guidelines are
designed to assist in applying various Coastal Act policies to individual permit deci-
sions; they do not, however, supersede the provisions of the Act or alter the Commis-
sion's statutorily created authority.
51. California Coastal Commission, Statewide Interpretive Guidelines § 7(A)
(May 3, 1977).
52. Guidelines, supra note 46, § A-4. Expansions to existing developed areas
naturally raise significant issues concerning coastal resources. The long-term policies
governing expansion of particular areas should therefore be addressed in the final
[Vol. 21
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The regional Guidelines also consider undeveloped par-
cels in the Malibu-Santa Monica Mountain coastal zone and
determine that only those parcels that are best suited for de-
velopment should be built-out prior to LCP certification. 3 Al-
though each undeveloped parcel is theoretically capable of
supporting at least a limited amount of development, the
Guidelines determine that, based on certain site-specific envi-
ronmental and economic factors, some parcels are better
suited than others for present development." The Guidelines
do not preclude the possibility of developing less suitable par-
cels, but encourage present development of certain parcels
and defer consideration of other parcels to the final LCP.
The objective of the Guidelines is thus to meet the imme-
diate need for housing in the region by directing growth into
areas best able to accommodate it. Such areas may be either
developed areas capable of expansion or undeveloped parcels
that are suitable for growth. The determination of whether an
area is suitable for present development was based on such
factors as efficient resource utilization, conservation and pro-
tection, and the impact of new development on LCP prepara-
tion. Designation of a parcel as unsuitable for present devel-
opment does not necessarily preclude even immediate
LCP and any development permitted prior to LCP certification cannot prejudice the
local jurisdiction's ability to prepare an acceptable LCP. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30250
(West 1977) requires that new development not have significant adverse impacts on
coastal resources. Since any development will create some degree of adverse environ-
mental impact, whatever impact results must be mitigated to be consistent with the
Coastal Act.
53. Guidelines, supra note 46, § B. There is currently a large inventory of unde-
veloped parcels in this area. The final LCP will ultimately address the potential de-
velopment of all the undeveloped parcels. Prior to LCP certification, expansion
should be allowed only in those areas best suited for immediate development in order
to reduce the potential for adverse environmental impacts, to protect coastal re-
sources, and to preserve planning options for the local jurisdictions.
54. The Commission considered the following factors, among others, in deciding
which areas are best suited for present build-out: 1) the existence of road access to
the parcel; 2) the existence of adequate water service; 3) the presence of utility ser-
vice in the area; 4) the suitability of the parcel for adequate driveway construction; 5)
whether the parcel is located within a designated "sensitive habitat" area; 6) whether
there are adequate water run-off measures; 7) whether there are any natural hazards
(such as landslides or rockfalls) in the area; 8) the slope intensity of the parcel; 9) the
development's impact on views; 10) whether there are any archeologically or pale-
ontologically significant sites in the area; 11) the impact of the proposed development
on public access; and 12) the nature of the proposed development (i.e., single family
residential, multiple-family, or commercial). See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 30210-30264
(West 1977 & West Supp. 1980).
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construction; it means only that the parcel's ultimate develop-
ment potential will be addressed in the county's LCP.
B. The TDC Pilot Program-Theory and Application
The implementation of a TDC system is the mechanism
proposed by the Guidelines for directing new construction
into the region's most desirable areas. Simply stated, the pro-
gram is designed to compensate owners of parcels found to be
unsuitable for immediate construction by allowing them to
sell the development potential of their lots to builders with
projects in developing areas. 6' By purchasing development
credits, the builders in turn are allowed to intensify the use of
their lots beyond current zoning limitations.
To initiate the process, the program designates two
classes of land: donor areas and receiver areas. The donor ar-
eas are undeveloped small lot subdivisions that have been de-
termined to be least suited for present development.6 The re-
ceiver areas are parcels located in developed areas that are
presently able to accommodate intensified use.57 The program
identifies the development potential in the donor area, quan-
tifies it according to various site-specific factors, and severs
this potential from the donor parcel by creating equivalent
development credits for transfer to receiver parcels. The
transfer of credits to receiver areas is encouraged by permit-
ting intensified use there, provided the developer has pur-
chased a sufficient number of credits.
The TDC theory recognizes that, although there is an
overriding public interest in sound land use planning, a prop-
erty owner should have the right to realize a reasonable eco-
nomic return on the property investment. Whether economic
return manifests itself in equity appreciation, rental income,
55. Guidelines, supra note 46. The Guidelines specify a formula for determining
the development potential of a given lot. Id. § E-5(c). One development credit is gen-
erated for each acre of donor area property, or, for the combination of two or more
donor parcels with a combined area of at least 2000 square feet, according to the
following formula: A/5 x (50-S)/35. (A is the area of the donor parcels in square feet
and S is the average slope intensity.)
56. Small lot subdivisions were selected as donor areas in order to reduce the
development potential of parcels deemed unsuitable for present development, and
because the uniformity of lot sizes makes credit valuation easier. The pilot program is
confined to those small lot donor areas so as to establish a foundation for predicting
the impact of TDC's on the real estate market under a larger scale program.
57. As determined by the factors described in note 54 supra.
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or even "just compensation" paid by the government when it
takes private property for public use,58 a property owner's
"distinct, investment backed expectations" have historically
been considered one element in the proverbial "bundle of
rights. '" TDC's incorporate this concept into an equitable ap-
plication that completely severs the right to develop the prop-
erty from the property itself, and allows the owner to then sell
this development right to other parties.
The policy goals of avoiding waste and inequity that
would result from unregulated development activity underlies
the legal separation of transferable development rights from
other incidents of ownership. These same policies can be seen
in other areas of property law such as mineral rights law. For
example, the law recognizes the right of a property owner to
sell the right to drill for oil on the property to others. Because
the right of the individual owner to drill into oil reservoirs
that extend beyond surface boundaries is subordinate to the
public interest and the interest of adjacent owners in fairly
and efficiently exploiting the underlying resource, the law en-
courages optimum utilization of the oil by allowing all owners
above the oil to "unitize" their drilling rights and transfer
them.60 The oil is thereby most efficiently exploited and deliv-
ered without depriving the owners of title to, possession of, or
a reasonable economic return from their property.
The surface development potential of a given geographic
area can be analogized to the underground oil reservoir de-
scribed above. The natural carrying capacity of the area is
analogous to the oil itself, and, like the oil, may not coincide
with legal property lines. Certain lots may be better suited
than others for development just as some may be more desira-
ble than others for oil drilling, and, unless the owner is able to
market mineral rights, surface development is practically the
only way to generate any form of economic return on the
property. Just as allowing each owner to drill his own oil well
58. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
59. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1979).
60. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 3630-3690 (West 1977). The public's interest in the
resource development potential of private property can be traced back to common
law principles that originated in medieval England. For example, in The King's Pre-
rogative in Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (K.B. 1606), the King was allowed to extract
saltpeter from private land without compensating the owner because it could be used
to make gunpowder, which in turn would be used to defend the country. The common
defense was an activity "in which every subject hath benefit." Id. at 1295.
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would result in wasteful and inefficient utilization of the oil
resource, allowing each owner to engage in unregulated sur-
face development would result in development patterns that
are not ecologically sound for the entire area. In resolving this
dilemma, mineral rights law does not defeat the right of any
one owner to strike oil on his property by only permitting cer-
tain owners to drill. Since such selective drilling rights would
be inherently inequitable, the law recognizes each owner's
right to a fair share of oil income. Conversely, current zoning
practices approach the dilemma by subjecting individual own-
ers to the planning discretion of the government. TDC's seek
to avoid this inequity by recognizing that an individual owner
should not be forced to sacrifice a reasonable economic return
on his property so that the public can enjoy the benefits of
proper planning. As mineral rights law prevents the waste and
inequity that would result from unregulated drilling by sepa-
rating oil drilling rights, TDC's discourage wasteful develop-
ment practices and the harshness of zoning policies by sepa-
rating the right to develop property from other incidents of
ownership. By allowing the donor parcel owner to sell the
property's development potential, the public interest in
proper planning and the private interest in economic return
are both recognized and respected.
The government's power to regulate development by us-
ing TDC's is also supported by the idea that a parcel's value is
partially created by the government. Although the develop-
ment potential of a given lot is largely dependent on its natu-
ral carrying capacity, various zoning ordinances and nuisance
laws place limitations on the absolute right of the property
owner to develop his land. The natural carrying capacity of a
parcel has little direct impact on its value unless its carrying
capacity corresponds favorably to present zoning classifica-
tions. In this sense, whatever development rights the property
owner has "trickle down" from the government via zoning and
nuisance laws. According to this "trickle down" theory, the
government has broad powers to exercise its police power to
regulate development, and need not recognize any inherent
development rights in favor of the property owner.61 In this
61. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, AND J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973). The
authors argue that any regulation short of actual physical appropriation by the gov-
ernment may be founded exclusively on the police power and need not be compen-
sated. See also Carmichael, supra note 5; Costonis, 'Fair' Compensation and the Ac-
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context, the TDC program is considered a gratuitous gesture
by the government intended to reduce the harshness of zoning
by compensating the landowner for the restrictions imposed
on the use of his property.2
Whether development rights are considered incidental
property rights similar to mineral rights, or are considered to
be created by the government as a function of zoning, TDC's
are consistent with accepted principles of modern property
law. Regardless of the legal status given development rights,
TDC's recognize the property owner's large economic stake in
the right to develop the property, as well as the public inter-
est in assuring that development activities are consistent with
the wise utilization of resources. TDC's are an attempt to eq-
uitably merge these competing interests.
The Guidelines apply the TDC concept in the region by
designating three geographically distinct transfer zones," each
containing donor areas and potential receiver sites. Receiver
site developers will be granted building permits provided they
purchase sufficient development credits from donor areas
within the same geographically related transfer zone. The geo-
commodation Power, supra note 5; Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
62. The California courts apparently have embraced the "trickle down" theory
regarding the property owner's right to develop his property. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Cdurt, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975). In HFH, the
California Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance which merely decreases the
market value of property does not constitute a taking. The plaintiffs were real estate
developers who had purchased a tract of land that was zoned for commercial uses.
Before they developed the property, the local zoning body rezoned the property for
agricultural uses only, causing a decrease in market value from $400,000 to $75,000.
Plaintiffs sought damages in inverse condemnation, claiming the rezoning deprived
them of "any reasonably beneficial use of the property commensurate with its value."
Id. at 512 n.2, 542 P.2d at 240 n.2, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368 n.2. The court ruled that
"'value' is of course not an objective quality, but a social attribute of legal rights." Id.
The court clearly rejected the argument that landowners enjoy a vested right in a
zoning classification. Id. at 516, 542 P.2d at 242, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370. See also Selby
Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr.
799 (1973); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); Navajo
Terminals v. BCDC, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108, 110 (1975) ("no support
for a claim that planning designations constitute takings").
63. Zone I consists of the Western Mountain Area, which is the major pilot pro-
gram area. Major receiver areas along the coast are eligible to receive TDC's from any
one of six undeveloped small lot subdivisions that lie inland in canyon areas and
mountainous terrain. Zone II is in the Cold Creek Basin area. Zone II's TDC potential
is limited because it contains many small lot subdivision donor areas but few poten-
tial receiver sites. Zone III contains many potential donor areas, but few receiver ar-
eas, and likewise will not participate in the TDC program to any great extent.
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graphical relationship aims to satisfy the statutory require-
ment that the adverse environmental effects of development
be mitigated. 4 Under the TDC program, the maximum allow-
able population in a particular transfer zone is not increased,
it is merely clustered into certain sites that have been deemed
most appropriate. The Guidelines reason that by shifting pop-
ulation densities within the same geographic area, there will
be no net adverse environmental effects. The increased de-
mands placed on the environment by the new development
are theoretically offset by preserving geographically related
donor areas as open space. Other factors cited as mitigating
the adverse effects of intensified development in the receiver
area are: 1) reduced energy consumption resulting from fewer
automobile miles traveled by residents who are clustered; and
2) not having to extend urban services into unspoiled areas. 6
With direct and cumulative adverse environmental effects
thus mitigated, expansion of existing developed areas can be
carried out in a manner that is consistent with the Coastal
Act's goal of efficient resource utilization.
During the permit application process, developers in the
receiver zone are given conditional project approval; the con-
dition is simply that they purchase enough development cred-
its to satisfy the Guidelines' "development credit exchange ra-
tio." 6 Donor area owners do not apply for credits but are
64. As pointed out in the Guidelines, supra note 46, § D-2, "(1] land divisions
establish both the location and intensity of new development and therefore, deter-
mine the amount of impact on coastal resources which will occur in the future. For
the most part, land divisions are irreversible." It can therefore be argued that TDC's
mitigation of adverse environmental consequences through geographically related
transfer zones is not consistent with the Coastal Act. Since the coastal zone is a sensi-
tive ecosystem and since land divisions are irreversible, it would seem that such an
indirect, off-site method of "protecting" the delicately balanced environment would
not completely offset the true adverse consequences of a new development. The Com-
mission recognizes this conceptual anomaly, but argues that by requiring a "two-to-
one" credit exchange ratio, the Act is satisfied. See note 66 supra.
65. Guidelines, supra note 46, § E-3.
66. Id. § E-5. One development credit is required for each new parcel created by
subdividing an existing parcel. For example, in order to divide one parcel into three
parcels, two credits are needed; to divide a combination of three parcels into four
parcels, one credit is needed. For multiple-family development, one development
credit is required for each new unit to be constructed. The number of required devel-
opments is reduced by the number of existing subdivided lots within the project site
(i.e., a six-unit project erected on two existing parcels requires four credits). See note
55 supra for the formula used to generate development credits. The formula and ratio
result in a two-to-one exchange. The credits from two donor areas are required to be
purchased for each added parcel in the receiver zone.
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required to advertise their desire to participate in the pro-
gram through "normal real estate market channels."6 Re-
ceiver zone developers are expected to purchase the requisite
number of development credits on the open market. The de-
velopment potential of the donor parcel is completely trans-
ferred when the developer-purchaser records a deed restric-
tion prohibiting residential development on the donor
parcel.5 Once that transfer has occurred, the developer is
given final project approval.
Participation in the TDC program is entirely voluntary,
but is encouraged by the creation of economic incentives. The
Guidelines do not prohibit the owner of a donor parcel from
applying for a permit to develop his land, but the limited
amount of development allowable under the Guidelines would
prevent immediate development from being a profitable in-
vestment.6 9 Thus, rather than choosing to build immediately,
the owner could instead sell his development credits to a re-
ceiver zone developer who would presumably be willing to pay
a higher price for them in order to complete his project.70
The TDC program is an attempt to more equitably allo-
cate the burdens of coastal resource preservation between the
owners of receiver zone and donor zone property. The devel-
oper who is allowed to intensify the use of his land and
thereby derive higher profits is required to mitigate the ad-
verse environmental impacts caused by his development by
participating in the TDC program.7 1 The donor parcel owner
67. Id. § E-4. The program contemplates that donor parcel owners wishing to
participate in the program offer their credits for sale in newspapers or in listings with
local realtors.
68. Id. § E-6.
69. The donor parcels were selected specifically with this fact in mind. The
standards used to determine the suitability of donor parcels for immediate develop-
ment impose such restrictive environmental constraints that the costs of construction
are not justified in light of the limited size of the dwelling that could be built on the
small lots.
70. The price the developer would be willing to pay would be a function of the
increased income he would gain from the intensified use of his parcel, minus the mar-
ginal cost of building an extra unit, plus the cost of acquiring the necessary develop-
ment credit.
71. To require the purchase of development credits to mitigate adverse environ-
mental impacts is in the nature of an exaction. The governing body of a city or
county is authorized "to require the dedication of land, the payment of fees in lieu
thereof, or a combination of both, for park and recreational purposes as a condition
to the approval of a final subdivision map." CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 66477 (West Supp.
1980). In Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 640, 484
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is given the opportunity to realize an economic return on the
property without actually developing it.
The TDC program reflects the shift in the policies under-
lying the 1972 Act and the 1976 Act. It recognizes the high
demand for housing that exists in the region and seeks to
most efficiently utilize the limited carrying capacity of the
area without compromising resource protection, or prejudicing
the county's ability to prepare an acceptable LCP.
Although the goals of the TDC program appear consistent
with the policies of the Coastal Act, questions remain con-
cerning the authority of the Commission to adopt such a
unique regulation. Also unresolved are issues concerning the
impact TDC's are likely to have on public and private prop-
erty owners. As will be discussed below, this author feels these
issues can be resolved in favor of the Commission and TDC's.
III. CHALLENGING THE GUIDELINES
A. Basis for Challenge
The Coastal Act gives the Commission authority to adopt
regulations to carry out the policies and provisions of the
Act.72 Although the Act provides specific criteria for the Com-
mission to consider in promulgating its regulations,7 8 the Cali-
fornia courts have held that the Commission additionally has
broad discretion "to weigh complex factors,"7' and that its
discretion is "immune from the remedy of traditional manda-
mus . . . which may be employed [only] to compel perform-
ance of a purely ministerial duty. 7 5 Since TDC's are not spe-
P.2d 606, 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (1971), the California Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of these exactions and held that they may be justified even without
a "showing of direct relationships between a particular subdivision and an increase in
the community's recreational needs." The court also held that "the owner of more
valuable land which will support a greater number of living units may be required to
pay a higher fee for each new resident than the owner of less valuable land with a
lower density." Id. at 645, 484 P.2d at 616, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640. In Frisco Land &
Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 918 (1978), the court held it was within the authority of the Commission to
condition the issuance of permits on the landowner's dedication of public access
easements.
72. CAL. Pu. REs. CODE § 30333 (West Supp. 1980).
73. See CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §§ 30200-30262 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
74. CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d
306, 316, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320 (1974). See Stanson v. San Diego Coast Regional
Comm'n, 101 Cal. App. 3d 38, 43, 161 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (1980).
75. State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 240, 524 P.2d 1281, 1284, 115 Cal.
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cifically mentioned in the Coastal Act as a ministerial
function of the Coastal Commission, the TDC program must
find its justification as a valid, discretionary, administrative
act.
The California Government Code provides that "any in-
terested person may obtain a judicial declaration as to the va-
lidity of any regulation by bringing an action for declaratory
relief. ' 76 Although the Commission maintains that its inter-
pretive guidelines are not "regulations,"' "7 it is applying them
in making permit decisions.78 The Guidelines therefore satisfy
the Government Code's definition of a regulation as a "stan-
dard of general application. .. adopted by any state agency
to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or
administered by it."79
The Government Code further provides that a regulation
promulgated by a state agency, in order to be valid, must
meet the following standards: (1) it must be consistent with
the statute granting the administrative agency authority to
adopt regulations;80 and (2) it must be within the scope of au-
thority delegated to the agency.81 Administrative regulations
are presumed to be reasonable by a reviewing court, unless it
can be clearly shown that the regulations are "so unreasonable
as to be arbitrary or capricious, or in excess of the authority
vested in the agency." '
B. Are TDC's Consistent with the 1976 Act?
To the extent that the TDC program attempts to balance
the competing interests of developers, environmentalists, and
property owners, the concept is in accord with statutory poli-
cies of local planning for balanced utilization and conservation
of coastal resources. 8" The program addresses the need for
Rptr. 497, 501 (1974).
76. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11350(a) (West Supp. 1980).
77. Letter from Coastal Commission Deputy Director Peter Douglas to Assem-
blyman Charles Imbrecht (July 1, 1977).
78. Sge, e.g., Application of Monte Markham (Appeal No. 119-79, August 1,
1979).
79. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11342(b) (West 1980).
80. Id. § 11342.2.
81. Id. § 11373.
82. See, e.g., Ralph's Grocery Co. v. Reimel, 69 Cal. 2d 172, 179, 444 P.2d 79, 85,
70 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (1968).
83. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
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housing in the region in a way that does not prejudice either
long term local planning options or the "delicately balanced
ecosystem. 8 4 Restricted private property owners are also pro-
vided with an opportunity for economic relief from the harsh-
ness of more traditional planning techniques. 5
If successful, the program will result in development pat-
terns that concentrate new growth "within or near existing de-
veloped areas." 86 Such an infilling approach should reduce the
pressures exerted on coastal resources by new developments.
Clustered development will reduce the amount of automobile
traffic in the area and facilitate public transportation. With
many frequent destinations centrally located, transportation
corridors will not be as extended, thereby making public
transportation a more attractive alternative to the automobile
and promoting the statutory mandate for minimizing energy
consumption. 7 By discouraging construction in the canyons
that comprise the donor areas, the program will fulfill the
1976 Act's requirement for preserving the geological integrity
of the coastal zone.88 The infilling approach to new develop-
ment will also help achieve maximum public access to the
coast by reducing the amount of beach front subject to private
control, thereby making each pathway to the beach more ac-
cessible to the public.89
In order to protect what it found to be a "distinct, valua-
ble natural resource,"' 0 the California Legislature has initi-
ated a truly ambitious planning process. It remains to be seen
whether or not this process will be successful in managing the
coastal zone, but in order to achieve statutory aims, creative
planning methods such as TDC's are called for. TDC's are
consistent with the statute, and a challenge to the Guidelines
founded on statutory inconsistency would appear to be with-
out merit.
84. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001(a) (West 1977).
85. If the commission or any local government body grants or denies a permit
"in a manner which will take or damage private property for public use," it must pay
just compensation. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30010 (West 1977). It is problematic
whether or not TDC's actually fulfill this policy objective.
86. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30250 (West Supp. 1980). See text accompanying
notes 30-33 supra.
87. CAL. PU. RES. CODE § 30253(4) (West 1977).
88. d. § 30253(2).
89. See note 33 supra.
90. CAL. PU. RES. CODE § 30001 (West 1977).
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C. Does the Coastal Commission Have Statutory Authority
to Adopt TDC's?
Although the Commission has been given broad powers to
effectuate the Coastal Act,"1 it cannot usurp the legislative
function of the local zoning body. While the Commission is
empowered to condition and restrict coastal development, it
may not rezone any areas within its jurisdiction, for to do so
would be a legislative function that is beyond the Commis-
sion's authority.2
The Guidelines resemble a zoning ordinance in the sense
that they establish standards of permissible development on
different parcels of land. The Guidelines are not, however, the
equivalent of a zoning ordinance. The Coastal Act has been
judicially determined not to be a zoning measure.9 8 Unlike a
traditional zoning ordinance, the Act does not specify a per-
mitted use within a designated area; rather it establishes a
protective overlay to existing zoning classifications. The
Guidelines do not reclassify present zoning in either donor or
receiver areas, but merely encourage development, within ex-
isting zoning limitations, that is consistent with the objectives
of the Act. The substance of the regulations established by
the Guidelines is thereby within the scope of the powers and
duties vested in the Commission.
Environmental legislation such as the Coastal Act derives
its authority from the state's power to regulate public nui-
sances.9 4 The Guidelines resemble restrictive spot-zoning to
the extent they single out certain parcels for more restrictive
uses; they are justified, however, by the overriding statutory
policy in favor of preventing environmental deterioration in
the coastal zone. Development that would lead to environ-
mental derogation is similar to a public nuisance, which the
administrative agency is required to prevent.
91. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
92. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65850 (West 1980) provides that the "legislative body of
any county or city by ordinance may: (a) Regulate the use of buildings, structures,
and land." Cities and counties have plenary power to zone, plan and issue permits.
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a). The Coastal Act does not intrude on this plenary power
because it applies only in the event of a conflict between local and state regulation, or
under the doctrine of state preemption of the local regulation. See CEEED v. Califor-
nia Coastal Zone, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 316, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325 (1980).
93. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
94. Id. at 319, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
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In sum, the Commission has been given broad powers to
restrict and condition development. Since promulgation of the
TDC Guidelines is an appropriate administrative action, and
since the goals of the program are consistent with the Coastal
Act, an assertion that the Commission has exceeded its au-
thority in creating the Guidelines is unlikely to succeed. While
the Commission is authorized to regulate coastal development,
neither it nor any other governmental body may regulate pri-
vate property in such a way as to take private property with-
out just compensation. Because the TDC concept deals with
development rights, it necessarily raises the question of
whether the regulation constitutes a taking. This author will
next argue that there is merit to a challenge based on the tak-
ing issue; however, such a challenge, even if successful, is un-
likely to render the program invalid.
D. The Guidelines and the Taking Issue
The issue of whether a land use regulation constitutes a
taking of private property without just compensation does not
lend itself to simplistic analysis.9 5 The fifth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." The U.S.
Supreme Court has found that this provision was designed to
prevent the government from forcing individuals to "bear
public burdens which, in all fairness, should be borne by the
public as a whole."'97 The Court has not been precise, however,
in defining what is a compensable "taking" of private prop-
erty. Admitting that the question of what constitutes a taking
has proven to be a problem of "considerable difficulty,"9 8 the
Court has stated it has "been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require
compensation. '"99 Whether there has been a compensable tak-
ing, then, depends largely upon the particular circumstances
of each case, resulting in what has been called the "crazy-quilt
95. See Costonis, 'Fair' Compensation and the Accommodation Power, supra
note 5; Sax, supra note 61.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See
National Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
98. 438 U.S. at 124.
99. Id. See also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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pattern of Supreme Court doctrine" regarding this issue.100
The cases confirm that the Court has engaged in "essen-
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries" in determining when a taking
has occurred.' 0 ' However, two factors have emerged as critical
in making the determination: 1) the economic impact of the
regulation on the property owner and the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations; and 2) the character of the governmental action in
question. 02 With regard to the second factor, the Court has
pointed out that a taking may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by the government rather than when the interference
arises from some "public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.' 103
The Court has generally expressed a tolerant view of land use
regulations that promote the public health, safety, and general
welfare.10 4
California courts have also shown a willingness to accept
restrictive land use regulations. The most recent California
Supreme Court case on the issue, Agins v. City of Tiburon,'0 '
held that a land use regulation will be found unconstitutional
and subject to invalidation "only when its effect is to deprive
the landowner of substantially all reasonable use of his prop-
erty." 6 In Agins, the court was asked to decide whether the
operation of the city's zoning ordinance, which severely re-
stricted a landowner's use of his property, 0 7 allowed the re-
100. Sax, supra note 61.
101. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978);
United States v. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); United States v.
Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
102. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Gold-
blatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946).
103. 438 U.S. at 125.
104. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Gold-
blatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S.
91 (1909); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
105. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affd., 447 U.S. 255
(1980).
106. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
107. The rezoning ordinance designated plaintiffs' property as "RPD-1", mean-
ing that the maximum authorized use of the property (a 5-acre tract) would be single-
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stricted property owner to seek damages in inverse condemna-
tion. The court held that declaratory relief, not damages, is
the appropriate relief in such cases.108 The court stated that
while there is a clear constitutional basis for the protection of
private property, the term "property" "denotes the group of
rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing,
as the right to possess, use, and dispose of it. . . . The consti-
tutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the cit-
izen may possess."10' The ordinance at issue in Agins re-
stricted the property owner's right to develop his property
but did not deprive him of substantially all reasonable use.110
The Agins decision suggests the California Supreme
Court's policy of keeping the processes of land use regulation
flexible enough to meet the changing needs of society. The
court noted that modern planning techniques, which are uni-
formly approved today, would probably have been rejected a
few years ago as arbitrary and oppressive.1 ' Land use plan-
ning is a particularly dynamic branch of the law. As cities ex-
pand and increasing pressures are placed on the environment,
the need for responsible, effective planning becomes more
profound. The court in Agins demonstrated a special sensitiv-
ity to the planning process by insulating the local planning
body from liability for money damages and the concomitant
"chilling effect upon the exercise of police regulatory pow-
ers"11' which would result from the imposition of civil
liability.
The California Supreme Court has also addressed the
taking issue in the context of Coastal Commission rulings. In
the watershed case of State v. Superior Court,1 5 the court
family residences at a density of not less than two nor more than one dwelling unit
per gross acre." Id. at 271, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375. The plaintiffs bought
the property for residential purposes, but the ordinance limited construction to a
maximum of five houses for the entire tract
108. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal Rptr. at 376.
109. Id. (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377
(1945)) (emphasis in original).
110. See note 107 supra.
111. 24 Cal. 3d at 275, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (quoting Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 372 (1926)).
112. Id. at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
113. See State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr.
497 (1974). See also Briggs v. State, 98 Cal. App. 3d 190, 159 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1979);
Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. App. 3d
785, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976); CEEED v. California Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43
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was asked to decide whether the Commission's denial of a de-
veloper's permit application gave rise to a cause of action in
inverse condemnation. The Commission denied the permit be-
cause the land proposed to be developed might ultimately be
designated as open space in the final coastal plan. Ruling that
the denial did not constitute a taking, the court examined the
purposes of the Coastal Act and the effect of the Commis-
sion's action on the property owner's land. The court looked
to the language of the Coastal Act to determine its purposes
and found that the permanent protection of the coastal zone
is of "paramount concern" to the people of California.' The
requirement of acquiring a building permit from the Commis-
sion was found to be an interim measure necessary to assure
that development in the coastal zone occurring prior to adop-
tion of the final comprehensive coastal plan was consistent
with the statutory objective of resource preservation. The
public interest in coastal resource preservation justified the
temporary restrictions on the individual's right to develop his
property.
Although State v. Superior Court construed the 1972 Act,
its reasoning remains sound under the 1976 Act. The permit
process can still be considered an interim program until LCP's
are certified. The Commission is empowered to restrict devel-
opment in order to preserve coastal resources pending adop-
tion of the final LCP's, thereby justifying restrictions on de-
velopment rights imposed by the Guidelines.
Whether TDC's constitute a taking of private property
has received limited judicial consideration, although the U.S.
Supreme Court dealt with the issue in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City.115 The Court was asked to
decide whether "a city. . . may place restrictions on the de-
velopment of individual historic landmarks in addition to
those imposed by applicable zoning ordinances without effect-
ing a taking requiring the payment of just compensation. ''16
Under the facts of the case, New York City's Landmarks
Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974). But cf. Sierra Club v. Coastal Comm'n,
58 Cal. App. 3d 149, 129 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1976) (the Act does not provide any present
possessory interest to the people in the coastal zone).
114. State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d at 253, 524 P.2d 1291-92, 115 Cal. Rptr.
507-08.
115. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
116. Id. at 108.
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Preservation Law designated Grand Central Terminal as a
historic landmark,' 17 which resulted in the imposition of addi-
tional building restrictions beyond those imposed by applica-
ble zoning laws.118 The owners of the terminal applied for a
permit to expand and remodel the building, but the permit
was denied. Under New York City's zoning laws, however, a
landmark owner who was prevented from developing his prop-
erty to the maximum density permitted under applicable zon-
ing ordinances could transfer unused development rights to
contiguous parcels or to parcels across the street.11' Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Company owned at least eight parcels
that were eligible to receive Grand Central's unused develop-
ment potential. Thus, there was a market for the unused de-
velopment potential, and it was a virtual certainty that Penn
Central would be able to take advantage of the development
transfer system.
The Supreme Court ruled that the operation of the
Landmark Preservation Law did not constitute a taking. The
Court weighed the economic impact and nature of the govern-
ment's action and determined that a diminution in property
value caused by a regulation does not constitute a taking un-
less the regulation renders the property "wholly useless."120 In
upholding the TDC program, the Court recognized an inher-
ent value in the transferable development rights and deter-
mined that "while these rights may well not have constituted
just compensation if a taking had occurred, the rights . . .
mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed, and
are to be taken into account in considering the impact of the
regulation. 1 2 1 In evaluating the economic burden placed on
the private landowner, the Court also noted that the regula-
tion did not prohibit current uses of the property. Since the
economic impact of the regulation was partially offset by the
ability to transfer development rights, and since the regula-
tion did not forbid the owner from continuing to use the prop-
117. Id. at 116-17.
118. Id. at 109. These restrictions include an affirmative duty to keep the exte-
rior of the property in good repair and to the Commission's approval of any proposed
alteration of the exterior features of the building.
119. New York City Zoning Resolution, art. I, ch. 2, §§ 12-19 (1978).
120. 438 U.S. at 128 (quoting Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355
(1908)).
121. Id. at 138.
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erty in its present fashion, the first critical "taking" factor was
resolved in favor of the government.
The Court then examined the character of the govern-
ment's actions. The plaintiffs did not challenge the city's au-
thority to regulate aesthetic features, and stipulated that re-
stricted development of historic landmarks was a legitimate
public purpose. Since the private property owner was not un-
duly burdened by the regulation, the second critical taking
factor was also resolved in favor of the government. The Court
in Penn Central awarded TDC's their first substantial judicial
victory.
TDC's were also examined by a New York court in Fred
F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York.122 There the
New York Court of Appeals struck down a TDC program that
required a private property owner to dedicate his land as a
public park in exchange for the opportunity to transfer the
site's development rights. The critical facts underlying the de-
cision were: 1) the regulation deprived the owner of any possi-
bility of using his land to generate a return on his investment;
and 2) the development rights were left in legal limbo,128 not
readily transferable to other property due to a lack of com-
mon ownership of the donor parcel and a suitable receiver
site. The program's flaw, according to the court, was that the
value of the development rights at the time they were at-
tached to the donor site might not be preserved when the
property owner went into the unpredictable real estate market
to try to sell them.124 Since the government's action deprived
him of the right to use his land (by requiring him to dedicate
it as a park), and since the transferable development rights
had no definite economic value, the court held that the gov-
ernment had destroyed the economic value of the property.'"
These cases demonstrate that a TDC land use regulation
may be struck down as an invalid exercise of the state's police
power if it precludes the owner's ability to realize any eco-
nomic return on the restricted property. Judicial scrutiny will
focus on the parcel's remaining permissible uses and the mar-
ketability of the transferable development credits. Further,
the regulation must be sufficiently related to a substantial
122. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
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public purpose and reasonably necessary to carry out this pur-
pose without imposing an undue burden on the individual
property owner.
In applying this test to the TDC Guidelines, the Coastal
Commission's action can be characterized as an interim re-
straint on the present development of certain parcels which,
according to the policies of the Coastal Act, should not be de-
veloped until after LCP certification. The public interest in
planning for the preservation and efficient utilization of
coastal resources justifies the Commission's temporary limita-
tions on the development of donor parcels. So long as the
public purpose does not unduly burden donor parcel owners,
the TDC program should pass constitutional muster.
There is no question the implementation of the Guide-
lines will result in significant economic impacts on property
owners. Although development credits are to be determined
by a constant formula, 12 6 the designation of a parcel as unsuit-
able for present (profitable) development will severely depress
its market value. Nevertheless, the Guidelines do not abso-
lutely deny the owner of the right to develop his parcel, but
merely limit the amount of development to a level consistent
with the Coastal Act. In light of Agins, it is unlikely the
courts will find that the limitations on permissible develop-
ment totally eliminate the owner's right to a return on his
investment.
The valuation of the TDC's presents problems similar to
those in Fred French. The credits in Penn Central had inher-
ent value because they could be transferred to other sites
owned by Penn Central that had already been determined to
be appropriate receiver sites. The credits in Fred French,
however, were not readily transferable since the owner of the
donor parcel was required to enter an unpredictable market to
sell them. The owner was thus placed in legal limbo, to the
dissatisfaction of the court. Small lot owners whose parcels
have been designated in the Guidelines as donor areas are
similarly required to generate their own compensation
"through normal real estate channels. 12 7 The government is
severely restricting the owner from any opportunity to profita-
bly use his parcel in a manner consistent with present zoning,
126. See note 55 supra.
127. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
[Vol. 21
LAND USE PLANNING
and is compensating him by thrusting him into the fluctua-
tions and uncertainties of the real estate market. Although de-
mand for housing is strong in receiver areas, the price received
for development credits is subject to external variables that
are not associated with their true value. The government
should not rely on a volatile real estate market that is subject
to inflation, credit policies, fluctuating demand, speculation,
Coastal Commission approval of development projects, and
other externalities to guarantee a reasonable economic return
to the owner of a restricted parcel.13 8
A constitutional challenge to the Guidelines is not likely
to succeed. Even in its present form, the TDC program does
not appear to be a taking because the donor parcels are only
restricted until LCP certification and because the restrictions
do not completely deprive the donor parcel owner of all eco-
nomic return on his property. Donor parcels can continue to
be used in their present manner and are not systematically
precluded from future development. Finally, the TDC pro-
gram does not compel participation by any landowner, but
merely provides economic incentives to encourage owners to
leave their parcels undeveloped.
As discussed above, however, there are problems in the
design of the transfer process. Most importantly, participating
donor parcel owners will be thrust into a position dangerously
close to the "legal limbo" decried in Fred French. This prob-
lem should be resolved before long term applications of TDC's
are undertaken.
E. Possible Solutions
The major legal problems that might jeopardize the
coastal TDC program arise primarily in the marketplace. Be-
cause of such externalities as inflation, speculation, rising in-
terest rates, population growth trends, contingent project ap-
proval by the Commission, and even the weather, the TDC
market is likely to become extremely volatile.3 9
128. See Comment, supra note 5, where the author argues that since the market
determines the value received for the credits, the landowner will not necessarily re-
ceive compensation equivalent to this loss.
129. Since the beginning of the program, approximately 20 credits have been
traded at an average price of $35,000-$40,000. The credits have come from the donor
areas that are most unsuitable for present development. As the supply of donor sites
diminishes, credits will have to be generated from parcels that are increasingly attrac-
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By taking an active role in the transfer process, the gov-
ernment could eliminate much of the instability in the mar-
ket. An extreme example would be if the government were to
control the market by setting prices, buying credits from do-
nor parcels, and selling them to receiver zone developers.
Under this scenario, a "TDC bank" administered by the gov-
ernment would provide an owner with more exact compensa-
tion for development credits. By reducing the potential im-
pacts of external economic factors, the price received for
TDC's would be more directly associated with their true
worth, as determined by the donor site's actual potential for
development. The risks and uncertainties of the real estate
market would be lifted from the restricted property owner,
and he would be guaranteed "fair compensation" for relin-
quishing the right to develop his land.
13 0
A less extreme possibility would be for the government to
enter the market as a purchaser and seller of credits without
actually setting prices or eliminating private participation in
the buying and selling of credits. This approach might be es-
pecially practical in the coastal zone with the Coastal Conser-
vancy acting as the government purchasing agent.18 1 The Con-
servancy, which through the State Public Works Board has
been granted authority to exercise powers of eminent do-
main, 18 could purchase enough credits to have a stabilizing
effect on the market price. As a public agency, the Conser-
vancy would be less profit motivated, causing the desired
smoothing effect on prices. The restricted landowner would
still be assured of receiving fair compensation but would not
have to bear the risks associated with a more volatile real es-
tive for immediate development. This may tend to increase the price of credits. (In-
terview with Peter Bass of the California Coastal Conservancy, February 7, 1980).
130. This theory is elaborated in COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIrr: SAVING URBAN
LANDMARKS THROUGH THE CHICAGO PLAN (1974). The author advocates the creation of
a municipally administered reserve which will receive, hold, and sell the development
rights of public and private landmarks, thereby creating a fund the city may use to
acquire a protective interest in threatened landmarks.
131. The Coastal Conservancy is part of California's Coastal Management Plan
(CCMP). See note 2 supra. The Conservancy, which was established based upon rec-
ommendations contained in the Commission's 1975 Coastal Plan, is responsible for
implementing a program of agricultural land protection, area restoration, and re-
source enhancement in the coastal zone. Establishment of the Conservancy adds ac-
quisition and restoration capabilities to the CCMP to complement the Commission's
regulatory and planning authority.
132. CAL. PUs. RES. CODE § 31106 (West 1977).
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tate market. Developers, in turn, would be guaranteed a sup-
ply of credits at prices which would lower total construction
costs.
A third alternative would be to have the government
guarantee the value of credits by establishing a minimum re-
purchase price at which it would buy otherwise unmarketable
credits. This approach would again guarantee "fair compensa-
tion" to the owner of the donor parcel, and the government
could permanently preserve the property as open space with-
out having to spend the larger sums of money required to gain
full title by eminent domain. The credits purchased by the
government could be transferred to other government land,
possibly to increase the availability of low income housing. By
keeping the government out of the exchange process except as
a last resort, the private sector would probably be more re-
sponsive to TDC's as well.
The problems with any active governmental role in the
TDC market are largely administrative and political. Ad-
ministering a new land use program and the bureaucracy it
would generate, setting and maintaining prices, public scru-
tiny and participation in the administrative process, and the
political distastefulness of economic manipulation by the gov-
ernment pose large problems inherent in any governmental
participation. The government must retain some measure of
control over the TDC market, however, to make the program
a truly effective planning tool. Its role must be flexible enough
to meet the contingencies of land use planning and to en-
courage private participation, yet must be firm enough to as-
sure restricted property owners a reasonable return on their
investment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The existing regulatory processes in the coastal zone can
provide the framework for solving the problems associated
with the administration of a TDC program. Because its plan-
ning and permit authority is temporary, the Commission can
adopt land use regulations that might otherwise pose serious
constitutional questions. If the TDC pilot program were
mandatory and permanent, it might very well constitute an
invalid exercise of the police power, but because it is only
temporary and voluntary, constitutional issues are bypassed.
The functioning pilot program will enable planners to deter-
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mine the feasibility of using TDC's as a planning tool of po-
tentially wide ranging application. Questions regarding credit
prices, acceptance by the private sector of TDC's, and
whether TDC's can be successful in achieving the statutory
goals of efficient resource utilization and conservation can be
resolved.
The unanswered questions concerning TDC's are worth
pursuing. Expanded government initiatives are necessary to
combat further environmental degradation caused by poorly
planned development. The individual property owner should
not, however, be forced to singularly pay for our collective en-
vironmental consciousness. Restrictive, non-compensatory
zoning results in harsh inequities to landowners who are
"zoned-out" of their development opportunities. On the other
hand, TDC's mitigate the inequities caused by zoning by pro-
viding some degree of compensation to restricted landowners,
and at the same time recognize that future development must
be carefully planned and located in areas that can support it.
Richard 0. McDonald
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